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ABSTRACT
Carrell, Sylvia T. MSECE, Purdue University, May 2018. SafeguaRDP: an Architecture for Mediated Control of Desktop Applications by Untrusted Crowd Workers.
Major Professor: Alexander J. Quinn.
The future of crowdsourcing depends on improving usability for the requesters
who post jobs. Allowing workers to perform tasks directly on a requester’s computer
could help, by obviating the need to adapt data into formats that a crowdsourcing
platform can handle. However, granting remote access to a requester’s desktop would
also pose the risk the workers might steal information or take malicious actions. This
thesis presents SafeguaRDP, an architecture designed to enable future services in
which a mediated and redacted desktop is shown to a remote worker. The redaction
of the desktop does not modify any ﬁles on the desktop; it only changes what is shown
to the worker.
This thesis contributes the rationale behind the architecture as well as a threat
analysis based on accepted software security principles. To place the SafeguaRDP
architecture in context, a set of eight vignettes illustrate potential applications that
would be possible with future services based on the SafeguaRDP architecture. With
these applications, the transfer of digital labor may someday become as simple as the
transfer of data today, all while preserving the privacy of the hiring party.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1

Motivation
As online labor markets grow and crowd-sourcing platforms expand their capabil-

ities and worker pools, security and privacy protection systems must keep up. Providing adequate security is not a problem unique to the crowdsourcing research area.
Dozens of recent media reports highlight security failures in companies which have
collectively led to the leaks of millions of users’ private data. How can crowdsourcing
systems be improved to allow untrusted workers to perform tasks involving sensitive
information directly on the requester’s computer while maintaining both privacy of
that information and security of the system from malicious actions?
Trust in institutions and their technical foundations have been undermined by
recent breaches of personal information, such as those of the United States Oﬃce of
Personnel Management (OPM), Equifax, Facebook, and countless others. Because
these breaches are mostly due to hacks, inside jobs, poor security, or a combination
thereof, the need for better security mechanisms is becoming more apparent. There
are many forms of personally identiﬁable information (PII) that, once stolen, can be
used against us, especially in critical combinations. For example, an adversary would
be able to uniquely identify only 4% of the U.S. population if they had access to a
person’s ZIP code, gender, and their year and month of birth. If the adversary also
had access to the day of birth, then they would be able to identify 63% of the U.S.
population [1].
According to Jeﬀ Howe, co-creator alongside Mark Robinson of the term in 2006,
“crowdsourcing” is deﬁned to be “the act of a company or institution taking a function
once performed by employees and outsourcing it to an undeﬁned (and generally large)
network of people in the form of an open call ” [2] [3]. With current crowdsourcing

2
platforms, people can hire qualiﬁed workers to complete tedious computer-oriented
tasks for them. However, the time and resources required to hire and train workers
on hand might be too intensive, depending on the task. It would be much simpler to
place the hiring aspect of delegation on an existing platform for crowdsourcing, such
as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT) or Upwork. However, the time and resources
required to set up tasks and collection methods for these existing crowdsourcing or
outsourcing platforms might remain prohibitive, especially if time is a limiting factor.
Setting up a task requires hours of preparation to ensure that the task is unambiguous
and data are in the correct format to be manipulated by the worker. Additionally,
unless an external database system is set up in advance to capture the results from
each worker, the results must be downloaded from the platform’s server and then
manipulated into a format that ﬁts the needs of the original task. I propose a system
that enables a person who needs some task accomplished, called a requester, to have
a task completed on his or her own desktop by inviting other people, workers, to
remotely access the desktop and perform the task. My system side-steps the need
to both manipulate the data and create a data collection database system before
outsourcing tasks.
The method I explore in this thesis enables remote workers to work directly on the
requester’s computer and limits what those remote workers can view on the desktop,
as speciﬁed by the requester. This automatic redaction happens without needing
prior knowledge of the structure of any particular desktop application. Additionally,
no ﬁles on the desktop need to be modiﬁed for redaction prior to starting the remote
desktop session.
SafeguaRDP is a prototype framework built to explore the viability of this method.
SafeguaRDP is designed to help people with their day to day tasks while maintaining
their privacy in such a way that it would be eﬀectively impossible to extract any
PII. In the current implementation, the protected PII is limited to those forms of PII
that the host user speciﬁcally self-selects. Templates will help requesters determine
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what PII to protect. Primarily, I want to prevent PII from being extracted from the
system, as well as maintain security of the system.

1.2

Contribution
To allow untrusted remote workers to perform data-oriented tasks directly on a

requester’s computer, an intermediate server grants an adequate position to enable
complete mitigation of a worker’s inputs and ﬁltering of sensitive text and screen
elements (via computer vision methods) that would otherwise be shown. I present
SafeguaRDP, a system, built on Apache Guacamole that acts as the aforementioned
intermediary server, that allows the delegation of tasks, speciﬁcally those involving
personally identiﬁable information, over a remote desktop connection. The host has
some digital task he wants to be completed that is diﬃcult to outsource using existing
platforms. The host’s computer is set up with SafeguaRDP. the host, or the requester,
uploads a list of patterns and/or words that are to be redacted by SafeguaRDP and
hires a worker to complete the task. The worker remotes in to the requester’s computer, via SafeguaRDP (on an intermediary server), and completes the task directly
on that computer. When the work is done, the worker logs out, leaving the requester
with the completed task and his or her personal information secure. The requester
may run a preview session and view the task as if he or she were remoting into his
or her own computer with the intermediary redaction and mediation system in place
and audit the list of words, patterns, and GUI elements to be redacted and inputs
to be allowed. Unlike other redaction systems, SafeguaRDP does not need to modify the ﬁles before they are shown to the remote user. The automatic redaction is
done in real time on the desktop as the remote worker views it, eliminating the need
to link redacted/unredacted ﬁles. While many of the examples given in chapter 4
are for personal use, there are applications where this platform may be useful in
professional/business/industry applications.

4
1.2.1

Research Question

The question this thesis endeavors to answer is: How can one maintain privacy of
information and security of a system in an abstract way, i.e., without being tied to a
single predeﬁned and/or already redacted application or document.

1.3

Vision
This thesis is motivated by a vision in which computer work can be safely delegated

to strangers, even if private information is involved. When fully realized, SafeguaRDP
would enable the following applications:
1. A teacher delegates his grade submission duties to a crowd worker, allowing him
to spend more time on his other duties.
2. The executor of her grandfather’s estate, a granddaughter transfers control of
her desktop, which contains her late grandfather’s digital records, to a crowd
worker, who transcribes important information from the ﬁles into a master
spreadsheet so it can be easily queried. By crowdsourcing this task, the granddaughter allows herself more time to focus on sorting out the non-digital aspects
of her grandfather’s estate.
3. A student hires a crowd worker to sort the ﬁles on his disorganized ﬁle system
into logical groups. Once the task is complete, the student spends less time
searching for ﬁles he needs and more time studying.
All of these tasks are repetitive and/or menial and not easily set up for crowd
sourcing (or even outsourcing to a single targeted worker) using already existing
platforms. Hence, the simplest solution is to hire some worker to remote into the
requester’s computer to complete the task in place.
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2. BACKGROUND
2.1

Related Work
Privacy concerns have become increasingly important and necessary, especially in

the crowdsourcing domain. Research has been performed to study the current state
of privacy of the requesters and workers. More and more researchers are including
privacy protection mechanisms in their crowdsourcing toolkits. Threats to privacy
in a task can come from the workers, the requesters, or even an outside party. As
mentioned in the introduction, Golle was able to uniquely identify 63% of the U.S.
population by combining their gender, full date of birth, and ZIP code using the 2000
census [1]. This is more optimistic that the earlier work done in 2000 by Sweeney,
who determined that 87% of the U.S. population could be uniquely identiﬁed with
the same information using the 1990 census [4]. Either statistic is alarming enough
to drive further research into the preservation of peoples’ privacy.

2.1.1

Privacy in Crowdsourced Tasks

This section gives a brief overview on the history of using remote desktops in
crowdsourcing tasks. Recent research has used remote desktops to share a static
selected part of the screen to crowdsourced workers [5]. However, such a system only
allows the worker to see and interact with part of the host’s desktop, which may be
insuﬃcient for many tasks.
Information (especially information considered to be PII) is at risk to be maliciously extracted by crowdworkers [6]. Lasecki et al. also studied the manipulation
of the outcome of a task as well as the behaviors of workers involved in both types
of attack. Malicious workers may act alone or as a coordinated group, knowingly or
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not. They discuss the possibilities to secure against such attacks; for example, they
suggest that a more motivated worker might be less willing to act maliciously if they
were paid enough for the honest task to render an attack task relatively less profitable. They also discuss automatic algorithms for privacy preservation, such as using
face detection algorithms to cover faces in images, or segmenting the information into
small enough pieces that no one worker gets enough information to understand the
whole. They suggest that text structure detection algorithms could be designed to
protect privacy.
Crowd workers may be willing to extract private information from other tasks, depending on the reward. One third of the 441 workers in studies conducted by Lasecki,
et al. were willing to act maliciously on other tasks regardless of the circumstances
surrounding the tasks, such as perceived sensitivity of information within the task and
level of reward on either the Attack or Target tasks [7]. SafeguaRDP prevents workers
from accessing any sensitive information at all, thus deterring malicious workers from
stealing it.
CrowdMask [8] built a PII ﬁltering system based on image segmentation, where the
crowd workers themselves were the ones who predicted where the sensitive information
might appear (they are each only shown a portion of any image). My system focuses
on text redaction and is automatically performed in advance of any worker viewing
an image (in my case, the remote computer desktop).
Mechanical Turk workers were surveyed in 2017 to specify what privacy protections
they expect from requesters. According to those surveyed, the most common privacy
issues Workers experienced were involved in tasks that asked for sensitive information
or led to spam or increased targeted ads related to sites browsed while completing
tasks. Workers revealed that they were collectively most concerned about sensitive
inquiries, unauthorized secondary use, and unauthorized sharing of their information
[9].
EmailValet is a dedicated email client that performs access control of a requester’s
emails through blacklists, whitelists, and by limiting actions that can be performed
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[10]. The system, designed by Kokkalis et al., is limited to one kind of task: allowing requesters to have their emails organized by (anonymous) crowdworkers. In
their analysis, they discovered that requesters became more comfortable with sharing
their private information as their study wore on, and workers similarly became more
comfortable over time working with the requester’s information.
Privacy of workers, speciﬁcally the concern that Mechanical Turk workers’ IDs
are linked to any other Amazon account they may own, is explored in [11]. Lease et
al. list potential risks to requesters of the exposure of workers’ PII, especially with
regards to discrepancies in the wording of institutions review board (IRB) forms.

2.1.2

Redaction of Text and GUIs

Sikuli [12] and its actively supported follow-on project SikuliX1 use OpenCV and
Tesseract to detect GUI elements for script automation purposes, but these are too
slow to be used in a real-time system.
Dixon and Fogarty’s Prefab toolkit reverse engineers graphical user interfaces
(GUIs) based on pixels within the GUI to model the underlying structure and functionality [13]. A future work item might be to use some implementation of an algorithm such as Prefab to automatically generate meaningful context of whatever
GUI(s) are on the screen at any moment, so the requester could tell my system to,
for example, “redact any save menu that might pop up.”
An automatic method for sanitizing text documents to optimize their utility while
detecting and redacting semantically similar terms from the document is proposed by
Sánchez et al. [14]. In later work, they continue their work by improving the utility
of the ﬁnal redacted document while retaining keeping a similar accuracy level [15].
Chakaravarthy et al. introduce a framework to automatically redact documents
and even include functionality to apply varying degrees of document sanitization
depending on users’ access control levels [16].
1

http://sikulix.com/
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Some work has been done to automatically sanitize health records of PII [17]
and [18]. These algorithms include using regular expressions and look-up tables of
text to detect sensitive information that should be redacted. Both groups determined
that their systems performed better than humans in accuracy of detecting PII in
health records, with the added beneﬁt of being faster and less expensive to handle
the sanitization of documents than humans.
Cooley and Smith use Canny edge detection instead of optical character recognition (OCR) to redact all detected text for screen-captures on “sensitive systems.”
Then the user can hand-pick what text to un-redact (if any) to retain maximum total
screen context while preserving privacy (speciﬁcally in medical settings) [19].

2.2

Privacy and Security in Remote Desktop Systems
Some companies have a technical support department that uses some form of

remote desktop access to aid its employees or customers in ﬁxing a myriad of issues
on their desktops. In the case of the tech support employee helping another employee
of the same company, the relationship between these employees is more trusting than
that of a customer-to-tech-support relationship, speciﬁcally in terms of incidental
exposure to proprietary or personal information.
The following desktop sharing products/protocols feature diﬀerent ways of connecting worker to host: Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)2 and Quick Assist3 (formerly known as Remote Assistance), Chrome Remote Desktop4 ,TeamViewer5 .
FreeRDP6 , and Apache Guacamole7 , All but the last two are proprietary remote desktop access tools. Guacamole depends on FreeRDP while extending its functionality.
All of these programs except Apache Guacamole require both ends of the remote con2

https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa383015.aspx
https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/20534/windows-10-quick-assist-faq
4
https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/chrome-remote-desktop/gbchcmhmhahfdphkhkmpfmihenigjmpp
5
https://www.teamviewer.us/
6
http://www.freerdp.com/
7
https://guacamole.apache.org/
3
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nection (remote host and local desktop) to have its respective application downloaded
and installed in order to gain remote access. It is possible to select to share either the
entire desktop or a single application window during a conversation in programs like
Skype or Google Hangouts, but these are view-only to the sharee. There does not
yet exist a platform to cherry-pick regions (i.e. multiple partial or whole application
windows) to hide within larger shared regions in interactive shared desktop systems.
Whether the desktop sharing protocol is proprietary or open-source, all of the
aforementioned products ensure security and privacy of the web traﬃc through the
use of encrypted channels between the host and remote desktops.

2.3

Eﬀectiveness of Existing Automatic OCR on GUI Applications
This section compares optical character recognition (OCR) technologies, speciﬁ-

cally on Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs), as opposed to printed text. Vijayarani and
Sakila compare eight various free and open source OCR tools with simple tests [20].
They found that fonts and special text formats (such as mathematical equations) are
diﬃcult to detect and preserve the original formatting in the ﬁnal output. Heliński et
al. compare ABBYY FineReader and Tesseract shows that the commercial product
by ABBYY outperforms Tesseract [21]. These comparisons may be out of date as
they are from 2015 and 2012, respectively, and updates to programs tend to boost
performance for both commercial and open-source products.
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3. SYSTEM
3.1

Implementation
To implement my system for evaluation and validation, I used virtual machines

(VMs). A VM is deﬁned by VMWare as a “software computer that, like a physical
computer, runs an operating system and applications,” with the added beneﬁts of
being portable, manageable, and secure.1 I use the following setup:
• One Windows 10 Home Edition desktop computer (host)
• Two Windows 7 Enterprise VMs
– One VM functioned as the remoted-into (requester’s) desktop,
– the other VM was the remoter’s (worker’s) desktop. Nothing special was
installed on either desktop—outside of a clean installation, the only modiﬁcation to these computers was to open up the ports to allow incoming
remote desktop connections.
• One CentOS-7 VM
– This is where SafeguaRDP is installed, including all of the modiﬁed combined Guacamole and Tesseract code, through which the remoter VM may
view the host VM’s desktop.

3.1.1

Networking

I set up the following network to allow the VMs and host computer to communicate:
1

https://pubs.vmware.com/vsphere-50/topic/com.vmware.vsphere.vm admin.doc 50/GUIDCEFF6D89-8C19-4143-8C26-4B6D6734D2CB.html

11
• Windows VMs
– Network Adapter 1 attached to: Host-only Adapter (Name: VirtualBox
Host-Only Ethernet Adapter)
• CentOS-7 VM
– Network Adapter 1 attached to: Host-only Adapter (Name: VirtualBox
Host-Only Ethernet Adapter)
– Network Adapter 2 attached to: NAT.
– Some ports forwarded from VM to host.
Note: I had at one time set up all the VMs to be able to talk to only each other
and the host, with only the host computer and the CentOS-7 VM connected to the
Internet. With another computer, I was able to connect to either of the Windows
VMs via the CentOS-7 VM running the SafeguaRDP system.
Restrictions on what the worker can see and do are based strictly on what is
shown on the screen. The requester does not have to change local and/or group
policy settings on his or her desktop to restrict access to the worker. Additionally,
the requester does not need to change settings within any applications to prevent
the worker from performing unwanted actions. The requester can choose to change
these policy settings if he so chooses; it will not have any eﬀect on the operation of
SafeguaRDP’s automatic redaction, but may give the requester more peace of mind
that his computer is safe.
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(a) Apache Guacamole’s architecture. Recreated from

(b) SafeguaRDP’s architecture, built on the Apache Guacamole architecture. The

the Guacamole website [22].

mediation mechanism is injected into the Guacamole client code. The redaction
mechanism is injected into the Guacamole server code.

Fig. 3.1. Comparison of the architectures of Apache Guacamole (left) and SafeguaRDP (right)
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3.1.2

Remote Desktop (Apache Guacamole)

Version 0.9.12 of the Apache incubating project Guacamole is the core of SafeguaRDP. Guacamole “is a clientless remote desktop gateway” that enables access to
remote desktops (via RDP, VNC, or SSH) from any web browser [22]. Guacamole is
open source and has APIs which allow for simple interfacing with other tools, and,
once it is set up on a server, the worker/remoter only needs access to a web browser
to connect to the requester’s desktop session. Unlike all other remote desktop systems, Guacamole does not require a dedicated application to be installed on both the
remoter’s and remotee’s desktops.
Guacamole’s “client-less” remote desktop is achieved by sending only the images
of the region that has updated on the remote desktop to the worker’s web browser.
This greatly reduces latency throughout the system, which is especially important
because the addition of the image processing on each image to the system introduces
latency (but not enough to cause disconnections between the server and client). The
Guacamole architecture is shown in ﬁg. 3.1(a).

Server
I modiﬁed the Guacamole server code, written in C, to add optical character
recognition (OCR) functionality through the open source tool Tesseract. This OCR
searches every image that is sent through Guacamole for certain strings or regular
expressions. When found, the ﬂagged string’s location is noted and passed into a
Cairo image library manipulator which then places a black box over that location.
The image is then sent to the client to be served to the remote user in their web
browser. It is possible, for each unique string, to place not only a black box over the
word, but also place text in the box that might be helpful to the worker to know what
kind of information that box is redacting, or even to distinguish between diﬀerent
redacted strings of the same format. The addition of the redaction mechanism to the
Guacamole architecture is shown in ﬁg. 3.1(b).
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Client
The Guacamole Client is built and deployed as a single .war ﬁle, served by the
Apache Tomcat webserver on the CentOS-7 VM. I modiﬁed the Guacamole client
code, written in Java, to enforce the following user input restrictions: whitelist certain
keyboard operations (e.g. only allow a-Z, 0-9, Enter, Backspace, Shift) and mouse
clicks (e.g. only allow left clicks). My aim was to duplicate the features of a kiosk
desktop system with regards to restricting user input without the luxury of being able
to use an actual kiosk system (which would reduce the authenticity of the real-world
use cases described in chapter 4). I also disabled the functionality of the Guacamole
clipboard, which would allow the remote user to copy text from the remote session
and paste it into their local desktop, or vice-versa. While this feature is useful in
other applications of Guacamole, the clipboard could have circumvented any visual
display ﬁltering I implemented. The addition of the mediation mechanism to the
Guacamole architecture is shown in ﬁg. 3.1(b).

3.1.3

Automatic Redaction using OCR

I set up an optical character recognition (OCR) function that searches for a given
string within each image before it is sent to the worker and puts a black box around
that word. This code was added to the base code of the Guacamole Server repository
and compiled together. I used the Tesseract text recognition library [23] version 4.0.0
for the OCR functionality and Cairo2 graphics library (which is already included with
Guacamole) to implement the box drawing. Tesseract is a popular free and open
source tool, and it has a C application programming interface (API). The continuous
string searching and pattern matching on a real-time desktop interface introduces
latency into the apparent responsiveness of the remote desktop. Future work will
include speeding up the current application of OCR within SafeguaRDP to improve
usability of the system.
2

https://cairographics.org/
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The worker is not able to see these rules, but they do see the eﬀect of them on the
remote desktop. It is assumed, however, that a determined adversary would be able
to view these rules as they are implemented right now. A possible mitigation would
be to encrypt the rules ﬁle.

3.1.4

Privacy Protection using Rules

A conﬁguration ﬁle with rules to detect speciﬁc strings or regular expressions
for format(s) of strings for which to search the screen may be placed within the
SafeguaRDP directory. For example, if the following were intended to be redacted on
the requester’s desktop:
• “Purdue Boilermakers”
• any phone number
• any string between a comma and a 5-digit number (as would likely be the format
of a mailing address)
• the text preceding the “@” symbol (an email address),
the redaction conﬁguration ﬁle might look like the following.
Purdue Boilermakers
^\d?[-./ ]?\(?(\d{3})\)?[-./ ]?(\d{3})[-./ ]?(\d{4})$\gm
,[\s\w]*(,|\s)*\d{5}/gm
^.*@/gm

3.1.5

Proof-of-Concept Implementation

To test whether the OCR addition to the Guacamole architecture functioned, I
set the conﬁguration ﬁle to detect one string, a series of mixed digits and alphabetical
characters. When logging in to a restricted account (“worker” in ﬁg. 3.2), the worker
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sees the requester’s desktop as soon as the login button is clicked. As shown in ﬁg. 3.3,
the OCR function was able to detect the location of all occurrences of the same string,
even detecting the diﬀerent text sizes and diﬀerent background color.
~ Apache Guacamole x

C I Ci

□

X

-

I :

127.0.0.1:8998/guacamole/#/

APACHE GUACAMOLE
worker

Login

iil'&511

Fig. 3.2. The screen the “worker” would see when logging into the
SafeguaRDP system.

3.1.6

Limitations of the Current System

The current implemented system has the following limitations:
• The worker is not restricted to using certain applications via SafeguaRDP.
– Using the RemoteApp functionality of Guacamole would allow the requester to limit the worker to one application, which would work for some
tasks, but not all.
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Fig. 3.3. In the proof-of-concept implementation, the OCR-based
redaction mechanism is able to detect the same string within the
screen no matter the size or background color.

• The transmitted partial desktop images are analyzed in isolation. The state of
entire screen is not stored.
– To perform the redaction algorithm on the entire screen at all times, SafeguaRDP could be modiﬁed to store the state of the entire screen by saving the locations of previously redacted regions and making decisions on
whether to redact a smaller chunk based on whether it is part of a string
or region that should be redacted.
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• Rotated text is not detected unless all text is in the same orientation within
the image. Tesseract can automatically detect primary text orientation, so if
all text were oriented the same direction, the OCR will work. To naively run
OCR on all orientations of an image would introduce too much latency into the
system such that Guacamole would time out and disconnect.
• Partially occluded, deleted, or transformed text is not detected. The rest would
be shown in the clear. Complete redaction of text within such regions could be
achieved by storing the whole state of the desktop with some known history of
previously found censored strings. Any time the updated image is near where
there has already been detected sensitive information, the censor box that was
there is maintained.
• OCR may fail on low contrast, uneven background, reverse text (e.g., text
selection), or unknown fonts. These shortcomings are a limitation of the OCR
tool itself. Human eyes are better at detecting and recognizing non-uniformly
displayed words than machines are, at least with current technology. However,
introducing humans to crowdsource perform this task would be too slow to be
useful in a real-time system.
• Access to unsafe applications and application features, such as accessibility
tools/features, is not restricted. Such applications and features could be made
diﬃcult to access for an unauthorized worker by disallowing certain user inputs
dependent on screen location, words in or near that screen location, and/or
previous actions. However, without using a locked-down kiosk desktop, implementing these within SafeguaRDP might not be feasible.
• The worker takes a screenshot with Snipping Tool and uploads to some online source. To prevent existing tools within the desktop from aﬀecting the
server-side automatic censorship would again require maintaining a history of
the desktop, as above, and maintaining the censor box for some short time,
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until some number of updated frames are guaranteed to no longer contain the
censored string(s).
It would be best to block mouse clicks based on whether the screen under it is
black (as sent from the Guacamole server); it is currently unknown if that feature is
feasible to implement on the server side. A Java proof-of-concept application was built
on the Windows desktop itself, but it is unknown if the program can be integrated
with the existing Guacamole application.

Proposals to Patch Limitations for an Ideal System
To patch these limitations, SafeguaRDP could be modiﬁed to use SikuliX, which
is slow, or OpenCV (faster) to restrict access to certain GUI menu functionality (such
as “save” or “delete entire ﬁlesystem”). However, implementing such functionality
would only increase the latency in the system where speed is the tightest constraint.
First, the OCR initialization cost, as well as the speed and accuracy of the individual
string detection functions, must be further optimized.
Alternatively, SafeguaRDP could by revised to use a commercial OCR (such as
ABBYY) instead of the free and open source Tesseract. Commercial OCR engines
are documented to be much faster and are more accurate than free and open source
OCR engines [21].
The redaction algorithm could be modiﬁed to mark diﬀerent sets of redacted
strings in order to distinguish, for example, all instances of phone number “A” from
all instances of phone number “B” from all instances of any street address. By
marking the redacted strings, the worker may be able to understand the underlying
composition of the application or document without seeing the sensitive information
within.
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3.2

Security Model
SafeguaRDP allows requesters to more readily trust strangers to interact with

their computers to complete some task or tasks that would otherwise take too many
resources to achieve. Redaction of the screen is divided into three groups: visible
and interactive, visible and non-interactive, and (the default state) non-visible and
non-interactive. By creating rules that specify the worker’s available user inputs and
visible screen regions, the requester has the power to restrict the worker to only the
user actions that are deemed necessary to complete the task assigned. The requester
speciﬁcally chooses what on the screen can be visible and/or interactive for the worker,
and anything outside of those chosen regions will be blocked out. My system “fails
safe” in this manner. The requester also chooses what user input actions may be
performed, by whitelisting key and mouse inputs. These can either be selected as a
pre-set combination of “safe” inputs, or the requester can pick and choose individual
keys to whitelist.

3.2.1

Security Framework

Saltzer and Schroeder characterize eight design principles that maximize system
protection [24]. Each principle is outlined below along with a description of how it
is applied to SafeguaRDP. Each principle is explained by a direct quote from [24]
denoted by italicized quotations, then described how it applies to SafeguaRDP. A
summary of how each principle applies to SafeguaRDP is presented in Section 3.2.1.
1. Economy of mechanism: “Keep the design as simple and small as possible.
. . . [D]esign and implementation errors that result in unwanted access paths will
not be noticed during normal use (since normal use usually does not include
attempts to exercise improper access paths)” [24]. From the worker’s perspective there are no interactions with SafeguaRDP other than to connect to the
host’s machine, and therefore there are fewer surfaces to exploit. By ensuring
the design of the architecture is simple, the functionality of the mediation and
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redaction mechanisms will be straightforward. The most complex block in the
system is Guacamole, which is treated as a black box for the purposes of analyzation (i.e. it is assumed that Guacamole functions as it is intended). The
requester is responsible for ensuring the chosen mediation and redaction options
are suﬃcient for each desktop application the worker might access.
2. Fail-safe defaults: “Base access decisions on permission rather than exclusion.
. . . A conservative design must be based on arguments why objects should be
accessible, rather than why they should not” [24]. The screen defaults to showing
the worker all black. The requester chooses speciﬁcally what to show to the
worker. Similarly, the requester selects which inputs the worker may use through
a whitelist of mouse and key press combinations.
3. Complete mediation: “Every access to every object must be checked for authority” [24]. In the SafeguaRDP architecture, each non-administrative login
to the Guacamole component may be ﬁxed to be usable once only. Once the
worker logs out of the SafeguaRDP session, either by logging out, timing out,
or being disconnected by the requester, the worker may no longer access the
requester’s desktop without a new set of credentials generated and delivered by
the requester. On the requester’s desktop itself (i.e. outside of SafeguaRDP’s
access), the requester may set permissions on certain ﬁles such that the worker
would need a password (which may or may not be disclosed to the worker) to
view and/or edit the ﬁle.
4. Open design: “The mechanisms should not depend on the ignorance of potential attackers, but rather on the possession of speciﬁc, more easily protected,
keys or passwords. . . . [A]ny skeptical user may be allowed to convince himself
that the system he is about to use is adequate for his purpose” [24]. The security
of the architecture is devised to be non-reliant on obscurity in its design and
implementation.
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5. Separation of privilege: “Where feasible, a protection mechanism that requires two keys to unlock it is more robust and ﬂexible than one that allows
access to the presenter of only a single key. . . . In a computer system, separated keys apply to any situation in which two or more conditions must be met
before access should be permitted ” [24]. The worker will only gain access to the
requester’s system after the requester has set SafeguaRDP up to protect the
system. The requester can execute actions that the worker may not.
6. Least privilege: “Every program and every user of the system should operate
using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job. Primarily, this
principle limits the damage that can result from an accident or error. It also
reduces the number of potential interactions among privileged programs to the
minimum for correct operation, so that unintentional, unwanted, or improper
uses of privilege are less likely to occur ” [24]. SafeguaRDP gives workers the
same level of privilege on the requester’s desktop in terms of operating system
(e.g. Windows) privileges; however, the worker is limited in the actions he or
she may take by the redaction methods of SafeguaRDP. The requester may
choose to reduce the privilege level of the Windows account that the worker
will access, but this operation is not implemented by SafeguaRDP.
7. Least common mechanism: “Minimize the amount of mechanism common
to more than one user and depended on by all users. Every shared mechanism
(especially one involving shared variables) represents a potential information
path between users and must be designed with great care to be sure it does not
unintentionally compromise security” [24]. The accounts created in Guacamole
within SafeguaRDP are not shared between requester and worker. The requester
may create workers’ accounts, but not vice-versa.
8. Psychological acceptability: “It is essential that the human interface be
designed for ease of use, so that users routinely and automatically apply the
protection mechanisms correctly” [24]. The graphical user interface that the
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requester will use to implement the worker input restrictions is intended to be
plain and organized, with an optional tutorial for beginners. The actual design
of that GUI will be left for future work. The redacted desktop shown to the
worker is designed to be as similar as possible to what a non-redacted screen
would look while providing obvious indicators of interactive limitations.

3.2.2

Security Requirements

In accordance with the security requirements framework outlined by Haley et
al. [25], the system’s adequate security requirements are as follows:
• Assets: Resources “involved in a system, be [they] tangible (e.g., cash) or intangible (e.g., information or reputation), [are] of value to the organization,”
decided by stakeholders [25]. PII (including but not limited to names, phone
numbers, birthdays), ﬁles on the system, corporate secrets, and other private
information.
• Domain: “When considering system behavior, the analyst must decide which
parts of the world to consider as part of the problem and therefore to include
in the analysis. An extreme view is that every atom in the universe is part
of every problem and, therefore, the analysis must consider everything made
of atoms. As this is clearly impractical, the analyst must choose a subset of
domains (real-world elements) that s/he considers relevant . . . By so choosing,
the analyst deﬁnes the system context” [25]. The domain in which SafeguaRDP
is analyzed is that of its built and operational state on a server. Strictly, the
software of the implemented architecture is included in the analysis.
• Trust assumptions: “[E]xplicit or implicit choices to trust a domain to behave
as expected and can have a signiﬁcant impact on the security of a system” [25].
I will assume I can trust the elements that were used to build my system, for
simplicity, e.g. the transistors and circuits that make up the computers used (as
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Table 3.1.
Summary of the design principles from Saltzer and Schroeder [24]
applied to SafeguaRDP. More detail is given in Section 3.2.1.
Principle

Evaluation (summary)

Economy of

The design of SafeguaRDP is simple to allow for straightforward

mechanism

functionality analysis of the mediation and redaction mechanisms.

Fail-safe

The requester selects regions on the screen for the worker to interact

defaults

with and/or see. Everything else is covered by default.

Complete

Every input the worker attempts to make in the remote desktop is

mediation

checked against the whitelist of acceptable user inputs as selected by
the requester.

Open design

SafeguaRDP does not rely on security through obscurity of design.

Separation

The worker may only gain access to the requester’s desktop after the

of privilege

requester has given credentials to the worker.

Least

The actions the worker may perform are whitelisted by the requester

privilege

before giving access to the worker. Attempted actions not encompassed by the whitelist are disallowed.

Least

The requester creates credentials for the worker to use to access the

common

requester’s desktop in SafeguaRDP. The requester’s account is not

mechanism

accessible by the worker.

Psychological The design of the GUI (and its usability analysis) that the requester
acceptability

will use to restrict worker actions will be in future work. Diﬃcult to
evaluate with respect to the architecture on its own.
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well as the computers themselves) are assumed secure. The system is analyzed
for security once it is all built and deployed on a server.
• Harm analysis: “In general, harm is caused by the negation of the security
concerns . . . conﬁdentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability” [25].
Stealing PII could cause theft of identity or damage to one’s reputation. Corporate information could be stolen, leading to loss of revenue for the company.
• Security goals: “The security community has enumerated some general security concerns: conﬁdentiality, integrity, . . . availability . . . [, and] accountability” [25]. The system shall prevent theft of PII. The system shall detect attempt
to steal PII. Logging is included within the system to keep track of who signed
on and when. Guacamole has an option to record the remote desktop session
if desired. The redaction and mediation functions are intended to preserve the
conﬁdentiality of the requester’s data.
• Security requirements: “[C]onstraints on the functions of the system, where
these constraints operationalize one or more security goals. Security requirements . . . are constraints on the systems functional requirements, rather than
being themselves functional requirements . . . [and] express the systems security
goals in operational terms, precise enough to be given to a designer/architect.
Security requirements, like functional requirements, are prescriptive, providing
a speciﬁcation (behavior in terms of phenomena) to achieve the desired effect” [25]. These “specify what the system should do in speciﬁc situations, not
how it should be done” [25]. The desktop is redacted by the server and only
then sent to the worker. The system should default to showing the worker a
blank screen in case the system detects a failure in the redaction or mediation
mechanisms.
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3.3

Threat Analysis
There are many surfaces at which an attacker could inﬁltrate and extract infor-

mation. It is almost always more diﬃcult to entirely defend a system from attacks
than it is to inﬁltrate it.
This section is divided into three categories: malicious worker attacks, external
adversary attacks, and threats that will not be considered.

3.3.1

Malicious Worker Threats

A malicious worker could try to circumvent SafeguaRDP’s visual redaction system
or delete ﬁles (either related to the task or not). The worker could upload any ﬁle
or screenshot from the requester’s computer to some web server and view it on their
own computer, bypassing SafeguaRDP’s screen redaction entirely.
Using the story in section 1.3, I present the following malicious worker attack
scenario:
1. The gradebooks are typically listed in alphabetical order—both the teacher’s
spreadsheet and the school’s proprietary grade submission platform.
2. If the worker/adversary were to know the teacher’s (the requester) IP address
or even his Internet service provider (ISP), they could ﬁgure out at which school
he or she teaches, or at least narrow it down to a few schools.
3. The adversary could steal from another source, say, directly from the school,
information about all students and for what classes they are registered. By
combining this information with the knowledge of the alphabetical order of the
teacher’s class, an adversary could de-anonymize the gradebook and glean which
student made which grade.
If SafeguaRDP makes an error and mistakenly makes visible information that
should be redacted, a malicious worker could steal this information.
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The primary risk is for an adversary to obtain individual pieces of private information that on their own are low-sensitivity (from multiple sources or from the
same source over a period of time) and aggregating that information into a complete
picture of damaging information.

Malicious Worker Mitigations
SafeguaRDP could be set up to redact ﬁle modiﬁcation words (such as “Save As”
and “Delete”). With the addition of blocking a click in any location on the desktop
with a censor box, actions related to ﬁle modiﬁcations can be discouraged. It would
be more diﬃcult to block arrow key action unless the system disables them entirely
(along with other keys) via a whitelist or blacklist of keys.
In the gradebook scenario above, the teacher and school could at least make the adversary’s job more diﬃcult by sorting by student ID number (which works to varying
degrees, depending on how the ID numbers are assigned to the students and whether
the numbers are otherwise obtainable) instead of alphabetically, or randomizing both
gradebooks. To prevent location information from being shared, the teacher could
spoof his or her IP address by using a virtual private network (VPN) or proxy. These
mitigations would be external to SafeguaRDP, but they could be included in a “best
practices” guide that would be available to requesters.
Unwanted uploads to external storage systems could be prevented if all Internet
traﬃc, other than what is necessary to connect to the server running SafeguaRDP or
to complete the task, is blocked. By simply modifying the ﬁrewall rules, the requester
can ensure that the worker can connect to the desktop but not upload anything to an
online storage system. These ﬁrewall rules would not be modiﬁed via SafeguaRDP;
the requester would change his or her own network conﬁguration on his or her own
system.

28
3.3.2

External Adversary Threats

An adversary could spoof my system, making it act as if it were operating correctly
to fool the requester, while in reality it is not performing correctly and allowing private
information to be extracted (e.g. a man-in-the-middle attack).

External Adversary Mitigations
To mitigate the above threats, the system may be adapted to encrypt ﬁles, namely
the conﬁguration ﬁle with all the sensitive information in it. To introduce additional
security, the system may authenticate every interaction with SafeguaRDP on the
requester’s system, in transit, and on the worker’s system. Additionally, the requester
may view the desktop as if he were the worker to ensure correct performance before
submitting the task to be completed by a worker.

3.3.3

Other Risks

In order to consider a security and threat analysis of the SafeguaRDP architecture,
a choice had to be made in terms of which components to (blindly) trust. To that
end, the machines involved in the implementation of the framework are considered
to be secure. Therefore, any situation where the adversary has physical access to
the requester’s machine or the server on which SafeguaRDP is running will not be
considered. If the adversary has physical access to any part of a system, that system
has already lost the battle. Attacks such as side-channel analysis and others make it
trivial to break a system’s defenses with physical access. It is assumed that the requester will not behave maliciously. Other attacks not to be considered: phishing and
social engineering. The security analysis primarily focuses on the technical aspects of
the architecture.
The following sets of risks, while valid in an analysis of the quality of completed
work, will not be extensively evaluated as they do not seriously impact the preserva-
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tion of privacy within the system. The analysis of the system will not include workers who make unintentional mistakes, intentionally perform subpar work, or cheat or
game the system to make more money, whether by creating multiple accounts or by
violating some other of the crowdsourcing platform’s rules.
Because these system threats are not directly related to the security of the system
or the private information held within, they are not included in system analysis.
Future work may reconsider these excluded risks.
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4. VISION
In this section, I discuss the overall plan for the automatic redaction system and my
to-date implemented contribution to it as well as present eight complete potential
use cases where an ideal implementation of SafeguaRDP can be applied to simplify
certain tasks. It should be noted that these eight examples are entirely ﬁctional. For
the redacted images, the screen underneath regions that are black are non-interactive
and not visible to the worker. The regions tinted blue are read-only, visible but not
interactive. The normal-colored regions are both visible and interactive to the worker.

4.1

Whole System Implementation
The initial goal for this thesis was to implement and test the following:

1. Set up some remote access desktop system: any of RDP, VNC, or X11.
2. Detect edges of GUI elements and track their movement by using something
like OpenCV. Detect changes in GUI elements such as total or partial change
in appearance, movement across screen, and scaling.
3. Use OCR engine to detect text and return its coordinates on the screen.
4. Block the visibility on the screen of a GUI element or group of elements or text.
5. Block certain user input, determined by analysis of previous user actions, mouse
location on screen, and/or whether or not the underlying GUI element is currently blocked. Whitelist or blacklist combinations of user inputs.
OCR functionality is a necessary but not suﬃcient requirement for total privacypreserving automatic redaction.
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4.2

To-Date Partial Implementation
Of the previously enumerated elements, I have implemented the below, namely:

set up a remote desktop platform, namely Apache Guacamole. Within Guacamole,
Tesseract, an OCR engine, is conﬁgured to detect words on the screen and give the
location of each detected word. With the location of every string on the screen and a
user-provided list of strings to be redacted, a program to place a black box over text is
implemented. On the Guacamole client side, worker keyboard inputs are whitelisted.
All of the above is integrated into a single system.

4.3

Example 1: Finding Shops for a List of Addresses
Lucas is an engineer who does not have much free time outside of his work and

family obligations. He has a spreadsheet of some personal information of his friends
and family. He wants to send ﬂowers to each of the people on the list. He is too busy
to individually look up dozens of addresses and ﬁnd the best shop(s) for each address
that deliver, so he uses the crowd to perform the task.

4.3.1

Setup

Lucas makes a ﬁle that includes patterns and strings that he wants to remain
hidden from the worker he hires. He puts a regular expression pattern that will hide
the unnecessary personal information from the worker. Simple patterns will work
to hide the phone numbers, birthdays, and social security numbers. Addresses can
also be automatically redacted with regular expressions. Lucas can write a regular
expression pattern that will catch text in a cell before the ﬁrst comma appears. If
Lucas chooses to, he can also protect the workbook with a password that will disallow
the worker from modifying the layout of the spreadsheet in attempts to circumvent
the automatic redaction. The patterns Lucas lists in the ﬁle will work to hide any
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occurrence of such patterns in the entire remote desktop session the worker sees, not
limited to the program(s) and ﬁle(s) he was told to use to complete the task.

4.3.2

Task Description

Lucas will hire a worker to complete the following task: “Find at least one ﬂower
shop for each ZIP code listed that delivers within that ZIP code. Give the website
URL for each shop.”

4.3.3

Story

Lucas’s spreadsheet with peoples’ personal information is shown in ﬁg. 4.1. While
only a dozen or so rows are shown, it is plausible that there be hundreds of these
contacts. A spreadsheet was chosen as the holder of contact information instead of
an electronic contacts manager to ease discussion of the redaction. Without loss of
generality, the same techniques listed here also work for any digital contact manager
Lucas might use, since the automatic redaction system is not limited to any one
desktop application or website by virtue of the properties of OCR, speciﬁcally that it
can detect words or patterns anywhere on the display regardless of which application
is displaying it. Once Lucas makes the redaction pattern ﬁle, he sets up SafeguaRDP
with this ﬁle and hires a worker to complete the task.
Figure 4.2 is how an ideal implementation of SafeguaRDP will look. In addition
to searching the screen for individual strings or patterns, the system will automatically put opaque black shapes over the regions of the screen that have not speciﬁcally
been selected by the requester. The system will use a computer vision library (such
as OpenCV) to handle the movement of features on the screen, i.e. if the spreadsheet moves twenty pixels to the left, the automatic redaction will keep track and
consequently adjust its redaction to match (in this case, twenty pixels to the left).
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4.4

Example 2: Submitting Grades
Mike is an overworked teacher who is tired of manually entering his students’

grades into the school’s proprietary grade-entering system. He decides his time could
be much better spent doing other things (such as writing lesson plans) rather than
tediously entering grades at the end of the semester, so he hires a worker to proxy
the entering of grades. To protect the students’ privacy, Mike uses SafeguaRDP to
automatically redact the personal information without having to modify the ﬁles on
his own computer. Once the system is set up, he will be able to use it with minor
adjustments in subsequent semesters. Many schools allow grade proxies to enter
grades for teachers.

4.4.1

Setup

Mike makes a ﬁle containing each student’s name and includes it in the creation
of the Guacamole session he will have the worker use. By disassociating the students’
names with their grades, FERPA law is not broken. Additionally, if Mike is a teacher
in a K-12 private or parochial school that does not receive federal funds, FERPA does
not apply. Student ID numbers are listed as directory information, so they are not
generally considered protected information1 .

4.4.2

Task Description

Mike hires a worker to enter his grades with the following task, “Given the spreadsheet (left) and web gradebook (right), for each student, enter the ﬁnal grade from
the spreadsheet into the web grading system by matching the student ID number and
selecting the correct grade from the drop-down menu in each row.”
1

https://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/mndirectoryinfo.html
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4.4.3

Story

Mike sets up his desktop as shown in ﬁg. 4.3. His Excel spreadsheet with the
students’ names, student ID numbers, and grades are to the left and the web browser
on the right is open to his school’s grade submission page. Next, he uploads the conﬁguration ﬁle he made earlier to the Guacamole server, where it is compiled into the
whole system. Once Mike sets up the necessary parameters to allow a remote desktop
session on his desktop, he changes the SafeguaRDP settings to point the remote desktop at his machine and makes an account for the worker to access his desktop via the
served web page. For security purposes, Mike changes the administrator password to
prevent the worker from modifying these settings.

4.5

Example 3: Organizing a File System
Dustin is a student who has many disorganized ﬁles plaguing his desktop, such

as class notes and bills. Many ﬁles need to be opened to categorize because the
ﬁlenames are not immediately indicative of the contents. Since Dustin does not know
beforehand which ﬁles might contain his personally identiﬁable information, or which
PII it might contain, it would be impossible and too time-consuming for him to preredact this information–he might as well organize his ﬁle system himself! However, he
might have thousands of these ﬁles, so he chooses to hire someone to do this tedious
task for him.

4.5.1

Setup

Dustin will place the text he does not want the hired worker to see in the conﬁguration ﬁle, such as his birthday, email address, phone number, and more.
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4.5.2

Task Description

Dustin will hire a worker to complete this task: “Organize my ﬁles into three categories: bills (subfolders for each year/month), pictures (subfolders: photos, screenshots), and other.”

4.5.3

Story

Dustin opens up the ﬁle explorer to the root directory he wants to be organized.
The worker’s view of this window is shown in ﬁg. 4.5. Any number of the ﬁles in
the ﬁle system might contain Dustin’s PII. After hiring someone to organize his ﬁle
system and sharing the credentials to login to the Guacamole session, Dustin can
relax while the worker begins the sorting. For each major folder he sees (such as
“Desktop”, “Documents”, “Downloads”, etc.), the worker completes the task to the
best of his/her ability. He begins by comparing ﬁle names, creation dates, and other
meta data to sort ﬁles. If the ﬁle is not usefully named, then he/she would open
up the ﬁle to determine the correct folder into which to place it. This situation is
where the auto redaction would shine: Dustin does not have to hand-redact these
ﬁles before delegating to the worker; he just has to put the list of things to redact
into a ﬁle and run SafeguaRDP.

4.6

Example 4: Modifying a CAD Drawing
Barbara is an architect who has a three dimensional model of a home in a computer

aided design (CAD) program which requires the user to either purchase to download
the program (which could be expensive and/or take up too much storage space) or a
license, such as Autodesk AutoCAD. PII might be Barbara’s or the customer’s name
and other info within the ﬁle properties, or elsewhere on the desktop.
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Fig. 4.5. Unorganized ﬁles as seen by the worker through SafeguaRDP.

4.6.1

Setup

Barbara creates a conﬁguration ﬁle with the speciﬁc words and patterns she wants
to hide from the worker, such as her full name and the customer’s name.

4.6.2

Task Description

Barbara hires the worker with the following task: “Change all door frame widths
in this building from 32 inches to 34 inches.”

4.6.3

Story

Barbara has AutoCAD running on her desktop. She hires the worker, who then
remotes into Barbara’s system via SafeguaRDP. The worker completes the task of
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changing the widths of all door frames and signs out of SafeguaRDP, at which point
Barbara reviews the completed work on her desktop.

4.7

Example 5: Transcribing an Estate’s Financial Records
Nancy, the executor of her grandfather’s estate, needs to organize her grandfather’s

digital bank records and bills. However, the ﬁles are disorganized and the ﬁlenames
are not indicative of their contents. She would like to ensure he was not delinquent on
any of his payments and to ensure all his accounts are in good standing. She wants a
spreadsheet containing the information from bills, receipts, and other documents so
that she may easily search it and determine the status of the estate.

4.7.1

Setup

Nancy lists the words and phrases she does not want the hired worker to see, such
as her grandfather’s name, his address, account numbers, and credit card information.
She places this in the conﬁguration ﬁle.

4.7.2

Task Description

Task: 1) Sort the documents (by date, type of document, etc), denote which ones
probably have important information, and, for the bills, rename them to the following
format: YYYYMM accountName wholeDollarAmountDue.pdf. For example, if the
bill was a .pdf ﬁle from Generic Gas Company for the month of March 2012 and had
$1983.57 due, the ﬁlename would be “201203 GenericGasCo 1983.pdf”. 2) Enter the
old ﬁle name, new ﬁlename, paid or owed party, and dollar amount (paid or owed)
into the spreadsheet provided.
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4.7.3

Story

Nancy’s desktop has a folder with bills and a spreadsheet open for the worker
to enter the requested information. Because the worker will be manipulating many
ﬁles of varying formats, the automatic OCR redaction functionality will be critical in
preventing PII exposure. She hires the worker, who accesses Nancy’s desktop through
SafeguaRDP. The worker opens each ﬁle he believes is a bill and performs the ﬁle
renaming task.

4.8

Example 6: Demonstrating Feature Functionality
In this situation, Joyce, an accountant, is using her company computer and the

company has set up SafeguaRDP in advance. A worker from the Information Technology (IT) helpdesk needs to access Joyce’s computer in order to show her how to
set up a printer. Before giving the IT worker access to her desktop, a pop-up appears
before her, where she may select what information or applications to prevent the
worker from seeing or using. It is not as necessary to hide whole GUI elements from
an IT worker as opposed to an unknown and potentially untrusted crowd worker, so
the primary use of SafeguaRDP in this instance is to use the OCR functionality to
hide private or secret information from the IT worker.

4.8.1

Setup

As mentioned above, the setup for this scenario is performed by the company’s IT
department. This setup can be done for all employees’ machines at once–only the IP
address needs to change as employees request help. The only input Joyce has in the
setup stage is to select what type of text to hide from the IT worker when he remotes
into her computer.
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4.8.2

Task Description

The IT helpdesk worker’s task is to show Joyce how to properly set up a printer
on her computer by remoting into Joyce’s workstation and demonstrating the proper
steps.

4.8.3

Story

Joyce is having trouble setting up a printer on her desktop, so she submits a
ticket to her company’s IT helpdesk. The IT worker obtains more information from
her and deems it necessary to remotely access her desktop to show her how to ﬁx the
problem. The worker sees Joyce’s redacted desktop and interactively demonstrates
to Joyce how to set up a printer on her computer.

4.9

Example 7: Organizing a Media Library
Steve has a vast library of disorganized music and video ﬁles that he wants to

be renamed with the title and artist in a certain format. Many of these ﬁles are
duplicated. To organize and remove the duplicates requires a worker to be able to
view his ﬁlesystem and make edits to ﬁlenames and folders. While it is unlikely that
Steve’s personal information is held within these audio ﬁles, the worker may stumble
across some document detailing, perhaps, a music order receipt with his name, email,
and credit card information. Therefore he will want to use SafeguaRDP to ensure
there is no extraction of his information.

4.9.1

Setup

Steve places the text he wants to be blocked from the view of the worker, such as
his address and credit card number, into a conﬁguration ﬁle and runs SafeguaRDP.
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4.9.2

Task Description

Steve hires a worker to organize the ﬁles on his desktop with the following task
description: “Rename all music ﬁles in my music library to the following format:
‘Artist - Song Title.<extension>’. If any songs are duplicates, move all but one to
the folder named ‘Duplicates’.”

4.9.3

Story

Steve opens his Windows Explorer to the folder containing the majority of his
music library. He then sets up SafeguaRDP and hires a worker to reorganize and
separate duplicates his music ﬁles. The worker accepts the task and accesses Steve’s
desktop. He uses Steve’s desktop as mediated by SafeguaRDP to rename the ﬁles
and separate the duplicates.

4.10

Example 8: Restructuring a Project’s Codebase

William, a software engineer, needs help editing many lines of code across many
ﬁles in a project. He hires an intern, Bob, to ﬁx the structure of the project. However,
Bob does not have the need-to-know about several parts of the project. To mitigate
Bob’s lack of need-to-know and still get the work done, William sets up SafeguaRDP
to redact certain words and phrases as Bob views and edits the project on a remote
computer.

4.10.1

Setup

William creates a ﬁle of the words, phrases, and patterns that he wants to hide
from Bob, such as information relating to the customer or proprietary information.
He then directs Bob to sign in to SafeguaRDP to begin the task.
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4.10.2

Task Description

William instructs Bob to restructure the codebase, removing any dependencies to
a deprecated library and organize the remaining ﬁles into related groups.

4.10.3

Story

William wants to have Bob remote into his desktop to modify the project structure.
Bob accesses the computer he is to work on via SafeguaRDP. Bob is able to view the
ﬁles he needs to (which are automatically redacted using the OCR functionality of
SafeguaRDP) and reorganizes the codebase to remove a certain dependency.
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5. SUMMARY
5.1

Discussion
The SafeguaRDP architecture will enable future services which will allow people

to transfer digital labor as digital data can be transferred today. While far from an
ideal implementation, the architecture I describe will allow future services, like those
described in chapter 4, to be performed safely and securely.

5.2

Future Work
Future work would predominantly include the application of the patches described

in section 3.1.6. Additionally, SafeguaRDP could be modiﬁed to apply to VNC as well
as RDP using Guacamole. It is possible to include multiple cursors/inputs so that
the requestor and worker can work side-by-side (so the requestor is able to continue
to use their computer while the remote worker is completing the deﬁned task). Other
future work might include any or all of the following suggestions:
• Implement other rule options, such as redacting pictures.
• Analysis of eﬀectiveness of selection of rules to comprehensively redact any
private information. Perhaps implement the algorithm used by [15] to detect
semantically similar search terms or come up with some other way to determine
whether or not a “word” or chunk of words found by the OCR is in a diﬀerent
format but still worthy of redacting.
• Perform a formal evaluation of eﬀectiveness of the redaction while retaining
usability of the user interface.
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• Combine desktop application settings with GUI-based restrictions, e.g. direct
the user to “protect” their Excel spreadsheet to provide another layer of worker
interaction control.
• Set up a crowdsourcing platform similar to AMT (or use an existing platform
like AMT, oDesk, or Freelancer) to allow user reviews and ensure payments are
fair and processed in a timely manner.
• Have a way to automatically redact all forms of a date or phone number. For
example, for a date like “July 4th, 1776”, also redact any other form the date
might take, such as “17760704”, “07-04-76”, “07-04-1776”, etc.
• Have a regular expression “helper” that automatically creates regular expressions based on selections like “date,” “phone number,” or “address.”
• Upgrade to the newest version of Guacamole to take advantage of introduced
features, such as the restoration of the event listener API, introduction of session
and server shutdown hooks, a dedicated database to track user login/logout
history, and various bug ﬁxes.
• If the worker wants to access some restricted operation, he could message the
requester, asking them to lift this restriction, perhaps along with a screenshot
and reasoning to lift the restriction. Such interactivity between worker and
requester might be beneﬁcial regardless, even if only used for task clariﬁcation
opportunities.

5.3

Conclusion
I have presented SafeguaRDP, a framework for a system that automatically redacts

information shown on the screen and mediates user input. Although the implementation based on the architecture is still in its nascent stage, the framework analysis
shows that it is certainly possible to create a platform to limit the exposure of sensitive
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information or PII to an untrusted crowd worker without speciﬁc a priori knowledge
of the application to be used.
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